Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
WISP 2012 Proceedings

Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and
Privacy (SIGSEC)

Winter 12-15-2012

IDS Alarms Investigation with Limited Resources
Jatinder N.D. Gupta
University of Alabama in Huntsville, guptaj@uah.edu

Ezhil Kalaimannan
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Ravi Patnayakuni
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2012
Recommended Citation
Gupta, Jatinder N.D.; Kalaimannan, Ezhil; and Patnayakuni, Ravi, "IDS Alarms Investigation with Limited Resources" (2012). WISP
2012 Proceedings. 15.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2012/15

This material is brought to you by the Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy (SIGSEC) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has
been accepted for inclusion in WISP 2012 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Gupta et.al

IDS Alarms Investigation

IDS Alarms Investigation with Limited Resources
Jatinder N.D. Gupta1
College of Business Administration, University of Alabama in Huntsville
Huntsville, Alabama, USA
Ezhil Kalaimannan
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Alabama in Huntsville
Huntsville, Alabama, USA
Ravi Patnayakuni
College of Business Administration, University of Alabama in Huntsville
Huntsville, Alabama, USA
ABSTRACT
Securing and defending computing networks has become a matter of growing importance
attracting the attention of both practitioners and researchers. Among the suite of tools available
to network managers to monitor and secure their networks are Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS); software and hardware systems designed and programmed to automate the process of
monitoring networks and analyzing them for potential breaches. One of the challenges presented
by IDSs is how do network managers prioritize and commit resources to investigate notification
by an IDS of potential threats to the network. In this paper, we consider this problem and
propose heuristic algorithms for how network managers can optimally allocate their limited
resources for investigating IDS notifications.
Keywords: IDS alarms, security investigations, weighted flowtime minimization,
heuristic algorithms, empirical results.
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INTRODUCTION
Network security and defense has become a critical and challenging issue ever since the
time when computers have been internetworked. Access to the internet also plays a vital role in
deciding the security levels of the internetworked computer systems and in turn has laid the
foundation to search and develop the best mechanisms and tools to protect information systems.
Intrusions are caused by attackers who attempt to gain unauthorized access to information for
which they have limited or no privileges. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) have been identified
as a key tool available to network administrators that aids in protecting the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information across computer or network security systems.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are the watchdogs of the information systems
(Axelsson 2000). IDS’s are software and hardware systems designed and programmed to
automate the process of monitoring events happening in a computer system or network and
analyzing them for potential security issues. An IDS can function both at host and network
levels. The advantage of IDS over firewalls comes from the nature of protection they provide to
a network. Firewalls protect and attempt to prevent intrusions in a network whereas IDS
continuously monitors the network and detects whether a network is undergoing an attack or any
form of security breach.
The main purpose of IDS is to detect and issue alarms for events that may potentially
indicate that security of the network has been compromised. The three main tasks that constitute
an IDS process are: (1) monitoring and analyzing traffic; (2) identifying abnormal activities; and
(3) assessing severity and raising alarms. The two important caveats to the process are instances
of false positive and false negative alarms flagged by the IDS. False positive alarm is triggered
whenever IDS detects an event as malicious when there is no actual intrusion. False negative
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alarm is triggered whenever IDS fails to detect an actual intrusion. The issue then becomes how
do network administrators deploy resources to investigate notifications that may potentially be
false positive alarms.
One way of classifying IDS with respect to the response nature of alarms are Active and
Passive systems. In active IDS, responsive action is automatically triggered whenever an alarm is
raised for an intrusive event or activity. The nature of responsive action varies depending upon
the type and severity of the attack. It is for this reason, an active IDS is also popularly known as
Intrusion Prevention System [IPS]. In contrast, passive IDS does not initiate any response to the
alarm but notifies any system administrator or someone else who will be able to take appropriate
actions to halt the attack and possibly trace the intruder. Active IDS has the ability to provide
rapid corrective action but if not properly configured, can raise a large number of false positives
thus denying access to legitimate users. On the other hand, passive IDS can be easily managed,
deployed and do not normally attack themselves. So, the administrator makes sure that the
suspicious activity is malicious before actually disconnecting the connection to the network.
The process of investigating the alarms plays an important role in using passive IDS. The
main reasons are: 1) the process of investigation does take time, and if the suspicious traffic turns
out to be malicious, then the damage to the firm increases with the delay associated with the start
and completion of the investigation process; and 2) the resources available for conducting such
investigations are often limited. For example, if the total investigation time available is limited,
some IDS alarm investigation may be delayed or not even investigated and in the case of false
positives the service shut-off thus incurring the risk of shutting down legitimate network traffic.
In this paper, we consider the problem of allocating limited resources to investigate a
given number of IDS alarms that are queued, to minimize total cost. We formulate this problem
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mathematically with the main objective to decide which alarms needs to be investigated and in
what sequence they should be investigated so that the total cost incurred by the firm is minimal.
To simplify our presentation, we consider the case involving a single investigator though our
analysis can be extended to cover multiple investigators. We also comment on the computational
complexity of the problem and develop heuristic algorithms to solve the problem.
PROBLEM FORMULATION AND COMPLEXITY
Consider the following scenario: a set N = {1,2,…,n} of n IDS alarms are received at
time zero to be investigated by a single security expert who has a total available time of T time
units. The severity of each alarm i

∈

N is si and the value of the corresponding customer or

activity for which IDS issues an alarm is Vi. The cost of investigating alarm i is cβ isi while the
time taken to investigate alarm i is ti = αisi . The loss in value due to delay in investigating an
alarm is δifi where fi is the finish time of investigating alarm i. Associated with investigative
effort for alarm i is the probability pi that investigation will reveal that the alarm is false. Given
the above scenario, it is desired to (a) determine which alarms should be investigated, and (b) in
what order each alarm should be investigated.
From the above problem description, it is clear that if alarm i is not investigated and the
connection is shut-off, the loss of value is vi = pi .Vi . On the other hand, if alarm i is
investigated, we could write the total cost, ci of investigating an alarm as follows:

Ci = cβisi + (1 - pi)δifi

(1)

To simplify the notations, for each alarm i, we define Ki= cβ isi and wi = (1 - pi)δi .
Given the above situation, we wish to select the alarms to investigate and to find the
order in which we should investigate the selected alarms so that the total investigation cost of the
alarms investigated and the loss in value of alarms not investigated is minimum. In order to
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formulate and solve this problem, we first assume that alarms are divided into two subsets, where
subset A denotes the alarms which are investigated and subset B denotes the alarms that are not
investigated.
The total cost of alarms in subset A, therefore, can be written as:

CA = ∑ Ki +∑[wifi]
i∈A

Since the term

∑

i∈A

∑

i∈A

(2)

i∈A

Ki is constant for a given subset A, it follows that minimizing

[wifi] will minimize CA. However, this problem is equivalent to solving the single machine

weighted flow time problem which can be solved by arranging the jobs (alarms) in descending
order of weight to time ratio (Smith 1956) (i.e., for any two alarms i and j, alarm i precedes
alarm j if wi/ti ≥ wj/tj). Therefore, the problem of sequencing the alarms, once it is decided which
alarms to investigate is polynomially solvable in O(nlogn) computational effort.
Now, to formulate the original problem, we assume that the alarms are numbered in a
descending order of their weight to time ratio (i.e., for any two alarms i and j, alarm i precedes
alarm j if wi/ti ≥ wj/tj). Let Xi be a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if it is included to be
evaluated and 0 otherwise. Then, the mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model of the
above problem is as follows:
n

(3)

min Z = ∑ [XiKi] + wi(fi - (1 - Xi) (T + Ti)) + (1 - Xi)vi]
i =1

subject to:
i

∀ i∈ N

(4)

fi - (T + Ti) + Xi (T + Ti) ≥ 0

∀ i∈ N

(5)

fi ≤ (T + Ti)

∀ i∈ N

(6)

fi ≥ ∑ Xrtr
r =1
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∑Xt ≤ T
i i

(7)

i =1

where Xi is binary (0,1) and T is the total time available to investigate the given alarms.
Equation (3) above represents the total cost to be minimized which reduces to equation
(2) for the selected investigations. Constraint set (4) finds the time of completion of investigating
alarm i while constraint sets (5) and (6) ensure that any alarm i not selected for investigation has
the completion equal to T + ti . Finally, constraint (7) ensures that the total time of all alarms to
be investigated is no greater than the total available time.
The above formulation of the IDS alarms problem contains n integer (0-1) variables, n
continuous variables, and 3n constraints. While the size of this MILP problem is quite
reasonable, MILP problem is NP-hard in the strong sense. However, while we conjecture that the
IDS alarms problem is NP-hard, its proof is still an open question.
HEURISTIC ALGORTIHMS
In view of our conjecture that the IDS alarms problem is NP-hard, we propose a greedy
algorithm to find an approximate solution to the problem. This is based on the fact that we do
know the sequence of alarms to be investigated. Further, we can decrease the problem size by
noticing the trade-offs between the investigation cost and the loss due to non-investigation of an
alarm. Thus, an alarm i should not be investigated if witi ≥ vi . In our algorithms below, we
assume that this reduction in problem size has already been accomplished.
In our first heuristic algorithm, we continue to investigate the alarms so long as the time
is available to do so. We do so in a greedy manner, i.e., we select the alarm to be investigated in
a greedy manner (in the descending order of their weights to time ratio). The steps of such an
algorithm are as follows:
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Algorithm G: A Greedy Algorithm
Step 0. Let the set of alarms be N = (1,2,…,n) where for each alarm i ≤ (n−1), wi/ti ≥ wi+1/ti+1, Set
A = B = ∅. Let F = 0 and i = 1.
Step 1. If F + ti ≤ T , enter Step 2, otherwise proceed to Step 3.
Step 2. If Ki + wifi < vi , set F = F + ti , A = (A,i) and proceed to Step 4; otherwise proceed to Step
5.
Step 3. Find i * ∈ A such that (a) F - ti * + ti ≤ T and (b) the total cost of rejecting i * and
accepting i is minimum. If such an i * is found, let A = A - \ i*, i and F = F - ti * + ti .
Enter Step 4.
Step 4. If i = n, proceed to Step 5; otherwise set i = i+1 and return to Step 1.
Step 5. Stop: Let the set B = N − ∖A. The alarms in set A are investigated while alarms in set B
are not.
However, the above greedy algorithm does not consider the improvements possible by
swapping some alarms between sets A and B since we did not specify the sets A and B in the
beginning. If these two subsets are known, we can attempt to swap some alarm from set A to set
B. The steps of this algorithm are as follows:
Algorithm GS: A Greedy Algorithm with Swaps
Step 0. Let A = (a1,a2,…,ak) and set B = N − A = (b1,b2,…,bn−k) be the sets obtained by algorithm
G. Let i=1.
Step 1. Let j = bi. Let s∈ A be an alarm such that F - ts + tj ≤ T . Let ΔC(j,s) be the difference in
the costs of the two schedules with alarms s and j swapped between sets A and B. Find s*
such that ΔC(j,s*) is minimum among all possible values of s∈ A . If ΔC(j,s*) < 0, swap
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alarms s* and j among sets A and B (i.e., let A = A − s* + j and B = B – j + s*, and F =
F − ts* + tj).
Step 2. If j = n−k, proceed to step 3; otherwise set j = j+1 and return to step 1.
Step 3. Stop: The alarms in set A are investigated while alarms in set B are not.
The algorithms G and GS above have computational complexity of O(n2).
ALGORITHM EFFECTIVENESS
To test the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms, we coded Algorithm G to solve
several problems involving four to six alarms with varying time, cost, and value loss parameters.
In each case, we obtained the optimal solution as verified by solving the problems in CPLEX.
However, the work on this project continues to show their effectiveness by empirically solving a
large number of problem instances with varying parameters.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has considered the problem of selecting the intrusion detection alarms to be
investigated to minimize total cost of investigations and the loss in value for non-investigation.
Based on preliminary experimental investigations, the proposed approach seems promising.
However, more theoretical, computational and field work is needed to verify these conclusions.
Further, we need to identify means to secure the parameter values, like cost and loss functions,
probability of an alarm being false and the investigation time needed for determining if the alarm
is false. We intend to report the results of these efforts in the near future.
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